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Making Sense of Akrasia 
 
There are two extreme poles in the literature on akrasia. Internalists hold that 
it's impossible to act intentionally against your better judgment, because 
there's a necessary internal relation between judgment and intentional 
action. To the contrary, externalists maintain that we can act intentionally 
against our better judgment, because the will operates independently of 
judgment. Critics of internalism argue that it fails a realism test—most people 
seem to think that we can and do act intentionally against our better 
judgment. And critics of externalism argue that it flirts with incoherence by 
severing the intimate link between judgment and action. Drawing on 
resources from phenomenology, the cognitive sciences, analytic action 
theory, and recent “hybrid models” of skilled action, I argue that one route 
beyond this theoretical impasse is to understand akrasia as a form of skillful 
pre-reflective intentional action. This strategy, I argue, preserves the 
internalist insight that there is indeed an intimate relation between judgment 
and intentional action; and it also confirms the externalist claim that this 
relation is defeasible, but it does so without falling into incoherence.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The puzzle of akrasia sets two powerful intuitions in paradoxical opposition. On one side, 
there’s the skeptical intuition that akrasia is impossible: it makes no sense that anyone would 
intentionally act against her better judgment. If an agent’s free to A, and she judges it best to A, 
why would she not-A?1 On the other side, there’s the voluntarist intuition that akrasia is not just 
possible but ubiquitous: most of us have experienced – and felt guilty and/or been blamed for – 
what feels like freely and intentionally acting against our better judgment. Call this the paradox 
of akrasia: akrasia is impossible, and it happens all the time.  
 
Rival theories mirror these conflicting intuitions. Judgment internalism – a theory that traces 
back to Socrates in Plato’s Protagoras – supports the skeptical intuition by maintaining that 
there’s a necessary internal relation between judgment and intentional action. You can’t 
intentionally act against your better judgment, because to act intentionally is precisely to act on 
your judgment. On this view, then, akratic acts are not intentional but rather due to a temporary 
loss of self-control typically attributed to excessive desire. Desire derails the agent’s practical 
judgment, forcing her to go against her own sense of what’s best. The biggest hurdle this theory 
faces is that no one buys it.2 It seems most people think that we can intentionally act against our 
all-things-considered judgments, and so chalking up every instance of such behavior to a lack of 
self-control sounds more like a plea for excuses than an explanation.3 J.L. Austin captures this 
attitude nicely in his description of akratic dinner party decadence: ‘…do I lose control of 
myself? Do I raven, do I snatch the morsels from the dish and wolf them down, impervious to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Some insist that this isn’t an intuition at all but rather something we only think ‘under the 
influence of theory’ (Wiggins, D. (1987). Needs, Values, Truth. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 239). As I 
see it, it’s the other way around. Arguments that akrasia is impossible take their lead from an 
intuition that crops up in everyday life. For example, when a loved one with a cancer diagnosis 
lights up a cigarette, we react with shock and disbelief, “But you promised the doctor you’d 
quit!” What underlies our consternation in such cases is the intuition that it makes no sense that 
anyone would intentionally act against her better judgment when the stakes are so high. 
2 For evidence that this is the common view of akrasia, see Mele, A. (1987). Irrationality. New 
York: Oxford University Press, and Mele, A. (2010). ‘Weakness of Will and Akrasia.’ 
Philosophical studies, 150 (3), 391-404. 
3 For empirical evidence for this claim, see Mele (2009), op. cit. 
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the consternation of my colleagues? Not a bit of it.’4 We may accept that some people violate 
their better judgment due to a lack of self-control – e.g., people who suffer from lesions in their 
vmPFC5 – but few will accept that a lack of self-control explains all such acts. For this reason, 
critics of judgment internalism hold that the view captures too much intentional action under 
the heading of agential breakdown, thereby exonerating too much bad behavior. As John Doris 
puts it, ‘millions of betrayed spouses can’t be wrong’.6 
 
On the other side of the argument, the voluntarist intuition finds support in judgment 
externalism. This theory – which traces its lineage to early Christian thought – understands the 
will as a mental faculty that is external to and functionally independent of judgment. This 
supports the voluntarist intuition, because, if the will acts independently of judgment, it’s no 
mystery that we sometimes intentionally act against our better judgment. The will, so to speak, 
can do its own thing, and so an agent can intentionally go against her evaluative judgment. But 
this replaces one mystery with others. If my will can do its own thing, independent of my 
judgment, why do my intentional actions so often flow seamlessly from my evaluative 
judgments? And why the consternation when they don’t? Moreover, in what sense is an akratic 
act a product of my will, if it violates the deliverances of my evaluative capacities? Why call it 
mine at all if it’s an independent non-cognitive power that can – like some alien force within – 
thwart my all-things-considered judgment? To capture these questions in a single worry: 
judgment externalism seems to render mysterious the intimate relationship between evaluative 
judgment and action. 
 
To make progress here, we need to negotiate a compromise between these extremes. Each view 
gets something right. Internalists are right to recognize the intimate relationship between 
judgment and intentional action. Not only is it a matter of fact that we tend to act in accordance 
with our better judgment; it is a normative expectation that agents exhibit such a tendency—an 
agent who never acted on his better judgment would not present as a normal agent. However, 
the externalists are right to treat the link between judgment and intentional action as defeasible. 
For it seems clear that we can and do act freely and intentionally against our better judgment. 
But it’s a mistake to purchase that defeasibility at the cost of undermining the internalist insight 
about the intimate relation between judgment and action. Our task, then, is to develop a theory 
of akrasia that walks the line between these views, preserving what each gets right while trying 
to overcome their shortcomings. 
 
I attempt to do so in what follows. In §2 I offer a more detailed diagnosis of the paradox of 
akrasia and sketch my proposed prescription. My basic diagnosis is that the paradox results 
when we approach the phenomenon of akrasia from the standpoint of the Deliberative Action 
Model; and my proposed prescription is that we tackle it from the standpoint of the Fluid Action 
Model. From this standpoint, I contend, we can make sense of akrasia as a form of skillful pre-
reflective intentional action. In §3, I articulate a major objection to this proposal, and I spend §’s 
4-5 answering that objection, while simultaneously elaborating my phenomenological account 
of intentional pre-reflective action. By §6, then, I’m prepared to offer a more detailed account of 
my proposal along with some examples to bring it to life. In §7, I answer another important 
objection to my view; and in §8, I assess my view against some relevant comparators, focusing 
in particular on how my account a) negotiates what Davidson called “the paradox of 
irrationality” and b) contributes to the contemporary discussion of “rational akrasia.” I conclude 
by identifying a problem that this paper leaves unanswered but that I deal with another 
forthcoming paper.7 This work is unique in that it brings the resources of phenomenology, the 
cognitive sciences, analytic action theory, and recent “hybrid models” of skilled action to bear 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Austin, J. L., 1956/7, “A Plea for Excuses,” in Philosophical Papers, 3rd ed., J.O. Urmson and 
G.J. Warnock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
5 For instance, it’s difficult to fault the akratic missteps of those patients described in Damasio, 
A. (1994). Descartes’ Error. New York: Grosset/Putnam.  
6 Doris, J. M. (2015). Talking to our selves: Reflection, ignorance, and agency. OUP Oxford, p. 
161. 
7 Forthcoming. 
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on a problem that for many years has almost exclusively been the province of analytic 
philosophy.  My hope is that it gets us somewhat closer to finally making sense of akrasia. 
 
2. Diagnosis and Prescription 
 
To begin with our diagnostic question, why do the above strands of internalism and externalism 
fall into their respective extremes? The answer, I contend, has to do with the philosophical 
tradition’s perennial commitment to the Deliberative Action Model (henceforth DAM). 8 
According to DAM, the paradigm of human action is action that flows from explicit deliberation. 
Thus, DAM’s core doctrine is that ‘full-blown’ – or ‘full-fledged’ or ‘full-blooded’ – intentional 
actions are in each case determined by an agent’s deliberative judgment. As Michael Bratman 
expresses it, ‘full-blown action involves the conclusion of a piece of evaluative practical 
reasoning.’9 This doctrine follows from a chain of intrinsic normative links that DAM forges 
between deliberation, judgment, intention, and action. That is, according to DAM, for every full-
blown intentional action ϕ, an agent deliberates about what to do; through deliberation she 
reaches the judgment that she ought to ϕ; in light of that judgment, she forms a prior intention to 
ϕ; then, unless she deliberates again and changes her mind, when the time to act arrives, she 
ϕ’s. For proponents of DAM, only this type of fully deliberated action reflects my practical 
agency in the fullest sense; and any break in this chain will undermine the intentional status of 
my action. Of course, defenders of DAM acknowledge that we sometimes engage in 
spontaneous non-deliberative intentional action—to deny that would constitute an obvious 
intellectualist distortion of the phenomenology of action. But they insist that to be intentional, 
these spontaneous actions too must flow from a prior act of deliberative reflection. For instance, 
on Korsgaard’s influential version of DAM, spontaneous intentional actions “need not involve 
any step-by-step process of reasoning, for when a principle is deeply internalized we may 
simply recognize the case as one falling under the principle...”10 Similarly, Watson claims that 
deliberation isn’t necessary when an intention is “completely scripted in advance by reasons.”11 
In other words, even spontaneous intentional actions are intentional only in virtue of antecedent 
deliberative processes. So what’s the connection between DAM and judgment internalism’s 
stance on akrasia? 
 
On the standard account of akrasia, the akratic agent deliberates about what to do, reaches an 
all-things-considered judgment that she ought to ϕ, forms a prior intention to ϕ in light of that 
judgment, and then she intentionally acts against that prior intention. Alternatively, it’s also 
possible that she never reaches the intention-formation stage, so that she makes an all-things-
considered judgment that she ought to ϕ and then, without forming a prior intention to ϕ, she 
intentionally acts against her better judgment. On this standard picture, then, the defect of 
akrasia lies in the agent breaking the ultimate or penultimate link in the chain DAM forges from 
deliberation to action; moreover, the standard picture maintains that the agent makes this break 
intentionally. 
 
By DAM’s logic, however, it’s impossible to break that chain intentionally. If, as DAM 
maintains, a full-fledged intentional action is an action preceded and guided by deliberative 
judgment; and to act akratically is to act against one’s better judgment; then akratic action 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 My discussion of DAM here is inspired by Wrathall’s (2014a, 2014b) recent discussion of two 
rival models of action in the philosophical tradition. See his introduction to Dreyfus, H. L. & 
Wrathall, M.A. (2014). Skillful coping: Essays on the phenomenology of everyday perception 
and action. OUP Oxford; and Wrathall, M. (2014) “Autonomy, Authenticity, and the Self” in 
Authenticity and the Self: Themes From Division Two of Being and Time (edited by D. 
McManus). Routledge, pp. 193-214. 
9 Bratman, M. (1979). ‘Practical Reasoning and Weakness of the Will’. Noûs. Vol. 13, No. 2, p. 
170. 
10 Korsgaard, C.M. (2009). Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity. Oxford University 
Press, p. 107. 
11Watson, G. (2004). Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press, p. 
136. 
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cannot be a full-fledged intentional action. For one cannot simultaneously be guided by one’s 
better judgment and act against one’s better judgment.12 Moreover, DAM also rules out the 
possibility that akratic action is spontaneous non-deliberative intentional action. For, according 
to DAM, such action can only be intentional in virtue of an antecedent act of deliberative 
reflection that, for example, allows one to immediately recognize that the current case falls 
under some deeply held principle. But the fact that deliberation precedes akratic failure implies 
that one does not immediately recognize the current case as falling under some deeply 
internalized rule of conduct—for if it did, deliberation would be unnecessary. Judgment 
internalism about akrasia is thus an implication of DAM: freely and intentionally acting against 
my better judgment seems impossible, because such action breaks the chain of intrinsic links 
that gives an action its status as a full-fledged intentional action. For this reason, internalists like 
Watson argue – against conventional folk-psychological wisdom – that akratic behaviour is best 
understood not as intentionally acting against your all-things-considered judgment but rather as 
a lack of self-control with respect to particular desires.13 The agent is simply too weak to keep 
the deliberative chain intact.14 Moreover, if this is right, then it seems wrong to hold agents 
responsible for akratic acts. For if they are too weak to control themselves, it would seem that 
the appropriate moral attitudes in response to their akratic misdeeds are, as Watson puts it, 
“shame and (if one goes in for this sort of thing) contempt, not guilt and indignation.”15  
 
As we saw above, externalists try to unravel this exculpatory logic by driving a wedge between 
judgment and the will. This idea – that the will functions independently of judgment – creates 
some logical space for blame and other reactive attitudes in response to an agent’s akratic 
failings: ‘He knew better, and he did it anyway!’ But this move runs into its own problems, in 
particular, it attributes akratic actions to the agent’s will without explaining how the will actually 
reflects her agency. In other words, like internalism, it places almost everything we associate 
with genuine agency on the side of deliberative reflection, and, in doing so, leaves us incapable 
of explaining in what sense akratic actions are properly agential. If we blame an akratic agent 
when his will makes a maverick move against his better judgment, why don’t we do the same 
thing with someone who suffers from compulsions? What makes the former properly agential 
and the latter mere compulsions? The problem with externalism, then, is that it’s really just the 
other side of the DAM coin. For it suggests that there’s no genuine agency outside the 
deliberative sphere—there’s just brute psychological incentives and “inchoate volitional 
spasms”16 that bear no specifiable relation to our purposive practical agency.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Watson makes this point forcefully in his seminal work on the will. Watson, G. (1977). 
‘Skepticism about Weakness of Will.’ The Philosophical Review, 86(3), 316-339; Watson, G. 
(2004). ‘The Work of the Will’ in Agency and Answerability: Selected Essays. Oxford University 
Press, pp. 123-158. In circumstances that call for deliberation, he argues, deliberative judgment 
plays an executive role in an agent’s mental economy, viz., it guides intention-formation within 
a legislative framework of reasons (2004: 136). In other words, for Watson, deliberative 
judgment does the work that we attribute to the will: ‘When intention fails to be guided by 
judgement, it fails to operate in its executive capacity—it fails to operate as a will’ (ibid.). 
Watson therefore argues that intentionally going against my better judgment is, strictly speaking, 
impossible, because my evaluative judgment is precisely what guides the formation of my 
intentions.  
13 This lack of self-control can be i) a consequence of an upbringing and/or mental constitution 
that makes me incapable of resisting certain temptations, ii) the result of some excessive desire 
temporarily derailing my capacity for self-control, or iii) some combination of i) and ii). 
14 For the sake of time, we can ignore the fact that not all akratic actions appear to be a matter of 
giving in to desire. For example, I could, in a distant possible world, judge all things considered 
that I ought to take the day off and not exercise tonight – because I’ve exercised too much lately 
– and then akratically break with that judgment and exercise anyway. Prima facie, that doesn’t 
look like giving in to desire. 
15 Watson, G. (1977). ‘Skepticism about Weakness of Will.’ The Philosophical Review, 86(3), p. 
333.   
16 The phrase inchoate volitional spasms is from Frankfurt, HG (1988), where he makes a similar 
point that a “choice” not guided by our preferences and priorities can’t really be understood as a 
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To capture our diagnosis in a sentence, then, DAM’s core doctrine – that only actions guided by 
deliberative judgment are full-fledged intentional actions – implies the truth of judgment 
internalism’s take on akrasia; and externalism’s attempt to break with the logic of internalism 
ultimately reinforces DAM’s fundamental assumption that the deliberative sphere is the sole site 
of agency. That’s the diagnosis. What might we do about it?  
 
I propose a two-part prescription. First, revise DAM’s core doctrine: deliberative reflection is not 
the source but rather a source of full-fledged intentional action. Second, identify an alternate 
source of intentional action. In taking this second step, however, we need to tread gingerly near 
the pitfalls of externalism, selecting an alternate source of intentional action that a) stands in the 
right relation to our practical agency and b) does not mystify the link between judgment and 
action.  
 
As I see it, the best candidate for this alternate source of intentional action is skillful pre-
reflective intentional action (henceforth SPIA). I will dedicate a good deal of what follows to 
explaining precisely what SPIA is, but here at the outset I should unpack the terms skillful and 
pre-reflective in a preliminary way, as these terms are multiply ambiguous. Actions are skillful if 
1) we can do them spontaneously without prior reflection, 2) they are under our control and yet 
3) sufficiently practiced to be partially automatic, and 4) they allow for fine-tuned adjustments 
on the fly in response to changes in the situation. Like Dreyfus and Brownstein17, I don’t identify 
skill with expertise but rather maintain that skillful action exists on a continuum from the 
novice’s mediocrity to the expert’s mastery, such that the majority of everyday action is skillful 
in the sense described by 1)-4). Now the term pre-reflective in SPIA hails from the existential-
phenomenological tradition and signifies a form of awareness that is not an explicit act of 
reflection (or second-order self-monitoring) but rather an immediate, first-order, non-
observational self-acquaintance.18 This pre-reflective self-awareness is a constitutive feature of 
phenomenal consciousness that makes possible reflection on my mental life – whereby I take 
my own mental life as an object of my awareness – because it is only in virtue of my original 
pre-reflective self-acquaintance that I can recognize my mental life as my own when I reflect on 
it explicitly. The existential-phenomenological tradition has long argued that if we bracket our 
rationalist assumptions and reflect on everyday action as we actually experience it, we can see 
that most action is done pre-reflectively – i.e., without explicit self-monitoring or reflection – 
and yet it is still intentional. My two year-old walks up to me, arms outstretched, and I bend 
down to pick her up; my wife asks me to grab the keys on the way out of the house and I do so 
without breaking my stride; my friend suggests that we pack up our laptops and grab some 
lunch, and my body is moving from my chair before I can reply. I don’t reflect before acting in 
these cases; neither do I act on completely pre-scripted reasons or principles internalized 
through a prior reflective process; rather, I spontaneously and intentionally respond 
appropriately to the situation. Pre-reflective intentional actions like these permeate our lives, 
and what I will here call the Fluid Action Model (or FAM) breaks with DAM and takes such 
actions as the paradigm of intentional action.19 
 
Although FAM has principally been developed by the existential-phenomenological tradition in 
the last 100 years, other traditions have made important contributions too, especially in recent 
years. For instance, in “Practical Competence and Fluid Action”, Peter Railton defends FAM and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
choice. “Rationality and the unthinkable,” pp. 177-190 in The importance of what we care 
about (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
17 Brownstein, M. 2014: Rationalizing flow: agency in skilled unreflective action. Philosophical 
Studies, 168, 545–68; Dreyfus, H. L. (2002). Intelligence without representation—Merleau-
Ponty's critique of mental representation. The relevance of phenomenology to scientific 
explanation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 367–383. 
18 The notion of pre-reflective awareness or pre-reflective self-consciousness has played a major 
role in the phenomenological tradition. For illuminating discussions of this idea, see Zahavi 
(2005, 2014). 
19 Again, Wrathall’s (2014a and 2014b) work has shaped my approach here.  
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argues that “all action – including in particular paradigmatic premeditated intentional action – 
has and must have unpremeditated action at its source and core.” 20  In other words, Railton 
argues that there is no autonomous agency unless SPIA is genuinely intentional. We can 
reconstruct his argument as follows: 
 
1) According to DAM, “bona fide intentional agency” combines a sense i) that one can 
choose among different action possibilities and ii) that one’s choice will ultimately 
determine what one does.21 
2) This view of agency implies certain gaps in everyday intentional action, e.g., a) the gap 
between making a decision and taking action, and b) the gap between initiating an 
action and completing it.  
3) For your actions to be attributable to you, then, you must fill in these gaps with bona 
fide intentional actions. 
4) However, from 1) and 2), it follows that if these gap-filling actions are to count as full-
blown intentional actions, then each one must have the same gaps to fill.22  
5) Thus, Railton concludes, a regress “…arises for any model of action that seeks to 
understand the distinctive operation of autonomous or rational agency in terms of some 
special sort of action on the part of the agent, whether the act is ‘choosing one’s 
reasons,’ or ‘endorsing certain reasons,’ or ‘identifying a certain reason,’ or ‘throwing 
one’s weight behind one reason rather than another.’ Since it would appear that these 
acts would themselves have to be done autonomously, the would-be agent has become 
Zeno’s deliberator.”23  
 
From this conclusion, Railton reasons that although deliberate choice is “one paradigm in the 
theory of rational or autonomous action”, it cannot be the only one, because such choice 
cannot function without “non-deliberative processes” that underwrite it.24 These processes, 
Railton argues, are not reflective, but “they are intelligent and responsive to reasons qua 
reasons. They make us the agents we are, and give our agency its capacity for rational, 
autonomous self-expression.”25 Thus, what DAM calls full-blown intentional actions can only be 
autonomous if SPIA is too. 
 
So the recommendation that we take SPIA as our alternate source of intentional action is not a 
just-so story designed to accommodate my pet theory of akrasia. There is a longstanding 
existential-phenomenological tradition that takes SPIA as the paradigm for intentional action, 
and there are arguments like Railton’s regress that suggest that without SPIA there can be no 
autonomous agency at all. To this existing body of work, I want to add the claim that SPIA, 
properly understood, can help us make sense of akrasia. 
 
The basic idea is simple. If it’s possible for agents to spontaneously engage in SPIA that isn’t 
preceded and guided by deliberation, then it should also be possible for an agent to form a 
judgment about what it’s best to do and then – without further deliberation – to spontaneously 
engage in SPIA that is inconsistent with that judgment. In other words, if we can spontaneously 
engage in SPIA without explicit deliberative judgment, then there’s no obvious reason why we 
can’t spontaneously engage in SPIA against our explicit deliberative judgment. Thus, SPIA gives 
us a plausible way to think about how we can intentionally break the deliberative chain 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Railton, P. (2009). “Practical Competence and Fluent Agency”. In D. Sobel & S. Wall (Eds.), 
Reasons for action (pp. 81–115). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  Railton, P. (2012). 
Two cheers for virtue, or, might virtue be habit forming? In M. Timmons (Ed.), Oxford studies in 
normative ethics volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 102. 
21 Ibid., p. 100. In this passage, Railton is specifically discussing John Searle’s action theory, but 
for the sake of brevity I’ve left out direct reference to Searle’s work. Interested readers can see 
Searle, J. Rationality in Action (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001): 15. 
22 Ibid., p. 102. 
23 Ibid., p. 103. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid.  
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discussed above: the akratic agent can deliberate about what to do, explicitly judge that she 
ought to ϕ, and then – without revising that judgment – pre-reflectively and intentionally not-ϕ. 
Akrasia is possible because we have an alternate source of intentional action in SPIA. 
   
3. Moving the Bump? 
 
The apparent simplicity of this proposal might make one wonder: Why hasn’t someone already 
done this? After all, akrasia is one of philosophy’s oldest problems, and there’s a rich existential-
phenomenological literature on SPIA going back more than a century, so if there were promise 
in this proposal, someone likely would have tried it by now. This thought, though reasonable, 
overlooks two important facts. First, DAM has dominated the philosophical literature on akrasia. 
Secondly, it’s only very recently that phenomenologists and cognitive scientists have developed 
theories that make SPIA look like a properly agential, bona fide source of intentional action. 
Indeed, if I had to rely on traditional accounts of SPIA, my proposal would suffer from the same 
problems that afflict externalism. Allow me to illustrate this claim with a quick look at two of the 
most influential accounts of SPIA in the last few decades.  
  
First, consider Hubert Dreufys’ seminal work on skillful action. According to Dreyfus, there are 
fundamentally “two distinct kinds of intentional behaviour: deliberative, planned action, and 
spontaneous, transparent coping.”26 At first, this sounds promising for our purposes, for he 
identifies transparent coping as an alternate source of intentional action. However, Dreyfus 
consistently characterizes such coping as utterly mindless: 
 
In fully absorbed coping, there is no immersed ego, not even an implicit 
one. The coper does not need to be aware of himself even in some minimal 
way...If the expert coper is to remain in flow and perform at his best, he 
must respond directly to solicitations without attending to his activity or to 
the objects doing the soliciting. There is no place in the phenomenology of 
fully absorbed coping for mindfulness.27  
 
In skilled coping, Dreyfus tells us, the agent “is totally merged with the world [and] there is no 
place for content, neither experiential nor propositional…”28 Thus, as Dan Zahavi notes, it 
seems that “absorbed coping for Dreyfus involves [no] experience” at all, as if “the relevant 
processing takes place nonconsciously.”29 How, then, does the expert fluidly respond to the 
situation in the right way at the right time? Stuart Dreyfus tells us in a summary of the view of 
expert action that he and his brother Hubert developed in Mind Over Machine: 
 
…with enough experience in a variety of situations…the brain of the 
expert gradually decomposes this class of situations into subclasses, each 
of which requires a specific response. This allows the immediate intuitive 
situational response that is characteristic of expertise.30 
 
In other words, the expert doesn’t need to think, no mindfulness or attention is required, 
because she’s simply responding to a situation she’s already dealt with and filed under a 
particular subclass. Her response is an automatic and mindless repetition of something she’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  Dreyfus, ‘Refocusing the Question: can there be skillful coping without propositional 
representations or brain representations?’, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, no. 
1  (2002), 413-425. 
27 Dreyfus (2007) Response to McDowell, Inquiry, 50:4, 371-377, DOI: 
10.1080/00201740701489401, p. 324, my emphasis. 
28 Dreyfus, HL (2013). “The Myth of the Pervasiveness of the Mental” in in Mind, Reason, and 
Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate (edited by Joseph Schear). Routledge, p. 29. 
29 Zahavi, D. (2013) “Mindedness, mindlessness and first-person authority” in Mind, reason, and 
being-in-the-world: The McDowell-Dreyfus debate (edited by Joseph Schear). Routledge, p. 322. 
30 Dreyfus, S. E. (2004). The five-stage model of adult skill acquisition. Bulletin of science, 
technology & society, 24(3), p. 180. 
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already done. 
  
If I relied on Dreyfus’s account skilled action, then, as I said above, my proposal for making 
sense of akrasia would suffer from a shortcoming reminiscent of the one that plagues 
externalism. The problem with externalism is that a will that acts independently of judgment 
doesn’t seem to bear any relation to one’s agency, and so the actions of that will don’t seem 
properly intentional. Similarly, if Dreyfus is right and skilled action is just an utterly mindless 
and automatic repetition of a past performance, it would be hard to see a skilled action taken 
against my better judgment as properly intentional. How can such an action be attributable to 
me if I lack even a minimal awareness of doing it and it’s nothing more than the automatic 
repetition of a prior action? Where is the agency in such a mindless action? Thus, Dreyfus’s 
version of SPIA would be a hard sell as a candidate for the alternate source of intentional action 
we need to make sense of akrasia.  
 
Shifting our attention to a second major player in the history of skilled action theory, Dual 
Process Theory (DPT) – at least in its traditional form – shows equally little promise for our 
purposes. Traditional versions of DPT share a core idea, i.e., within the brain there are two 
cognitive systems with independent goal structures. Authors typically refer to these systems as 
system 1 and system 2. On the standard view, system 1 – the system that executes spontaneous 
skilled action – is said to be unconscious, myopic, automatic, fast, and high capacity. And 
system 2 – the system responsible for deliberative reflection – is said to be conscious, farsighted, 
controlled, slow, and limited in capacity. Moreover, system 1 is made up of innate cognitive 
modules and habitual tendencies that produce mandatory and rigid responses to environmental 
stimuli, while system 2 is a domain-general intelligence marked by ‘flexible goals and flexible 
cognitive control’.31  
 
Again, this sounds promising for our purposes at first, because DPT identifies two sources of 
putatively intentional action. But that bubble of promise bursts when you reflect on the 
description of system 1 processes: if intuitive system-1 skillful action amounts to a kind of 
modular or overly rehearsed subpersonal automatic processing – devoid of the kind of flexible 
normative responsiveness that we associate with full-blown practical agency – then it’s unclear 
how it could serve as the kind of alternate source of intentional action we need to make sense of 
akrasia. In other words, when described as automatic, mandatory, modular, habitual, rigid, 
myopic, unconscious, and so on, intuitive system-1 responses don’t sound all that agential. For 
our purposes, then, DPT shows no more promise than Dreyfus’s approach.32  
 
If we relied on these views, then, taking SPIA as an alternate source of intentional action would 
not solve the problem faced by externalism; it would merely “move the bump in the carpet”, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Evans & Stanovich, 2013, p. 229. Despite DPT’s intuitive appeal, the notion that the brain has 
two separable cognitive systems has come under fire in recent years, even by major proponents 
of the view. For instance, Stanovich and Evans (2013) argue that almost all the characteristics 
typically associated with the alleged two systems are not essential features of two psychological 
kinds but rather incidental correlates that occur with high frequency under controlled 
conditions. Moreover, the view’s neuroanatomical division of labour appears to be an elegant 
fiction. In fact, the neural regions linked to the two systems constantly interact, so much so that 
all attempts to map two psychological systems on distinct neuroanatomical regions have failed 
(Kelley, Wagner, & Heatherton, 2015). 
32 To be clear, I’m crafting a narrative here that explains why no one has pursued my proposal 
for making sense of akrasia. I am not saying that no version of DPT can (or will) ever generate a 
theory of skilled action that is up to the task. I am simply trying to show why some very 
influential theories of skilled action, historically speaking, would not have been suitable. Of 
course, some authors have used DPT to address the issue of akrasia. For an excellent example, 
see Levy (2011). Levy’s account is complex and interesting, but it’s not germane here, because 
he does not attempt to make the automatic system 1 action seem properly agential.  
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pretending to solve the problem by relocating it. 33  Fortunately, in recent years, some 
phenomenologists and cognitive scientists have developed accounts of SPIA that show more 
promise for our purposes. Of particular importance for me are 1) a relatively new interpretation 
of Heidegger that, pace readers like Dreyfus, argues that skilled action, for Heidegger, has an 
ineliminable, first-personal dimension34, and 2) recent “hybrid” or “mesh” theories of skilled 
action from the cognitive sciences, i.e., theories that insist on the “interpenetration [or mesh] of 
thought and action” 35  in our everyday skillful comportment. 36  This second point is very 
important to get across before I give my account of SPIA. Against the views of Dreyfus and DPT, 
I reject the dichotomy between mindful reflection and mindless skill. Like Christensen et al., I 
endorse a “mesh” view, which proposes that “controlled and automatic processes are closely 
integrated in skilled action.”37 In what follows, I draw on these recent developments to show 
how SPIA can help us make sense of akrasia.  
 
4. The Phenomenology of SPIA 
 
I begin by sketching a broadly Heideggerian phenomenology of SPIA. To be clear, I’m not 
interested in faithfully representing Heidegger’s actual view here, nor am I commenting on his 
work. I leave that to more accomplished Heidegger exegetes. My aim is to use some 
Heideggerian tools towards my own ends. On the interpretation of Being and Time I favour, the 
key to Heidegger’s phenomenology of SPIA is his pragmatic account of human understanding.38 
According to this account, we make sense of the world in terms of the skills we possess for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 A very astute and helpful anonymous reviewer raised this objection to an earlier draft of this 
article, i.e., that my view was merely moving the bump in the carpet. I wrote this section to 
unpack that objection, and I wrote §5 to answer it.   
34 Here I am influenced by Steven Crowell’s development John Haugeland’s notion of existential 
commitment: ‘Existential commitment ... is no sort of obligation but something more like a 
dedicated or even a devoted way of living: a determination to maintain and carry on. It is…a 
resilient and resolute first-personal stance’ (Haugeland, "Truth and Rule-Following" in HT, p. 
341). Crowell follows Haugeland’s insistence that the normativity of action – the fact that what 
we do is always governed by (tacit or explicit) standards of success or failure – presupposes a 
kind of existential commitment to the norms that are constitutive of the kind of agent I’m trying 
to be. As Crowell puts it, for Heidegger, ‘what is being done (work) can be unambiguously 
identified only if it involves a being who is trying to do it’ (Crowell, S.G. (2013). Normativity 
and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger. Cambridge University Press, p. 217). 
35 Sutton, J., McIlwain, D., Christensen, W., & Geeves, A. (2011). Applying intelligence to the 
reflexes: Embodied skills and habits between Dreyfus and Descartes. Journal of the British 
Society for Phenomenology, 42(1), p.80.  
36 A close relative of this new approach is the attention-control view defended by Bermúdez: “If 
you are acting skillfully, then you are reflecting, because performing a skilled action requires 
that throughout performance your attention is structured by a higher-order, performance-related 
intention” (2017, p. 900). This is similar to the mesh view, because it sees high-order thought at 
work in skilled action; but it’s different in that it works in the framework of DPT and 
characterizes this higher-order thought as reflective and representational. See Juan Pablo 
Bermúdez (2017) Do we reflect while performing skillful actions? Automaticity, control, and the 
perils of distraction, Philosophical Psychology, 30:7, 896-924, DOI 
10.1080/09515089.2017.1325457 
37 Christensen, W., Sutton, J., & McIlwain, D. J. (2016). Cognition in skilled action: Meshed 
control and the varieties of skill experience. Mind & Language, 31(1), 43. 
38 My pragmatic interpretation of Heidegger here works in a vein mined by Dreyfus, H. L. 
(1991). Being-in-the-world: A commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I. Mit Press; 
Crowell, S.G. (2013). Normativity and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger. Cambridge 
University Press; Engel, A. K., Friston, K. J., & Kragic, D. (2016). The Pragmatic Turn: Toward 
Action-Oriented Views in Cognitive Science; Haugeland, J. (2013). Dasein disclosed. Harvard 
University Press; Martin, W. (2006). Theories of Judgment: Psychology, Logic, Phenomenology. 
Cambridge University Press; and Rouse, J. (2015). Articulating the world: Conceptual 
understanding and the scientific image. University of Chicago Press. 
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dealing with it, and we acquire those skills by being socialized into the practices of our 
community. The term practice here is broadly construed as a set of norms that govern and are 
constitutive of a set of activities in which I can participate when I am properly socialized and 
therefore possess the relevant skills. That is, in each practice, a set of norms – which can be 
made explicit but are typically only exhibited in behaviour – determines what counts as 
successful participation in that practice. To be clear, such participation isn’t about perfect 
conformity with an uniformly codified set of regulations; it’s a matter of adhering to the relevant 
norms as I understand them, and there is scope for experimenting with those norms in my efforts 
to align my performances with the normative expectations of other agents engaged in the 
practice.39 According to Heidegger, when an agent is socialized into such a practice, she 
acquires what he calls a Seinkönnen—the “ability-to-be” a competent participant in that 
practice. I translate Seinkönnen here as existential ability (henceforth EA).40 For Heidegger, our 
EAs allow us to participate in the practices of the shared world—they allow us to adhere 
competently to and experiment with the norms of those practices, and to make sense of 
ourselves in terms those practices. EAs are abilities in the sense that they determine what we are 
capable of doing, and they are existential in the sense that what we can do in part defines who 
we are in the world.41 Finally, for Heidegger, our EAs are what make us capable of SPIA: each 
EA is a skill (or a set of skills) that allows us to spontaneously and intelligently respond to the 
world in (at least roughly) the right way.42  
 
It helps to explain the concept of an EA with an example. Consider my role as a philosophy 
instructor. This EA i) informs the way certain action contexts show up for me and ii) fixes what 
my actions mean to me in those contexts. To illustrate the first point, when I enter a seminar 
room, the skills I’ve acquired in my training as a philosophy instructor give that action context 
its pedagogically salient affordances43—I find chairs, tables, and whiteboards arranged in 
relation to each other in a way that facilitates my work as a teacher, and I ignore aspects of the 
room irrelevant to that work. Moreover, my competence in the practice of teaching philosophy 
allows me to appreciate the room’s arrangement as good (or bad) for that end. Turning to the 
second point, the EA also fixes what my actions mean to me in that context. In the seminar 
room, my gestures, speech, and board work have their precise meaning in light of the fact that 
I’m trying to teach philosophy. For instance, when I talk about epistemic closure, my students 
and I experience that speech act as an attempt to teach. And the act is fixed with that meaning 
because in that context everyone present understands what I say and do in light of my EA as a 
philosophy instructor. So, on Heidegger’s view, I am capable of taking appropriate skilful pre-
reflective intentional actions when I teach philosophy, because I’ve acquired the EA – or set of 
skills – that makes that context fluidly intelligible to me. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 This is an important point about the norms of social practices raised in Rouse, J. (2007). 
"Social practices and normativity." Philosophy of the social sciences 37, no. 1, pp. 46-56. 
40 Macquarrie and Robinson translate Seinkönnen as both ‘possibility’ and ‘potentiality-for-
Being’. There are good reasons for doing so. But I think the term existential ability better 
captures the connection Heidegger draws between our abilities-to-be and our self-
understanding.  
41 Scholars who interpret Heidegger’s position in this vein typically say that socialization allows 
an agent to occupy a ‘social role.’ I find this term inadequate, however, because although some 
abilities-to-be are social roles (e.g., teacher, husband, writer), not all of them are. For instance, 
my daughter has recently acquired skills and abilities that allow her to play piano, but it seems 
artificial to say she’s taken up a new social role. So I prefer the broader notion of an existential 
ability. 
42 If EAs are just skills, why use both terms? This is a reasonable question, but I think the term 
‘existential ability’ conveys something important—these skills define who we are, our being-in-
the-world. The term skill doesn’t convey that by itself, and I think it’s important to convey that 
Heideggerian insight.  
43 I borrow the term ‘affordances’ from Gibson, J.J. (1986). The Ecological Approach to Visual 
Perception. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
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Some philosophers explain Heidegger’s concept of an EA by comparing it to Korsgaard’s notion 
of a ‘practical identity.’44 This works well in one respect: for Korsgaard, your practical identity is 
a ‘self-conception’ or ‘a description under which you value yourself and find your life worth 
living and your actions to be worth undertaking’45; and, for Heidegger, your EAs play a similar 
role structuring your values and actions. To stick with the same example, my obligations to my 
students matter to me in terms of my EA as a philosophy instructor—if I weren’t committed to 
that EA, those students would not stake a claim on me in the same way, and I would treat them 
differently. So the Korsgaard comparison works in that sense.  
 
But there are at least two respects in which the comparison fails, and these failures are worth 
mentioning because they cast important features of our EAs in relief. First, practical identities are 
highly complex social roles – such as teacher, parent, and lawyer – that are associated with 
specific contexts, duties, and commitments. Heidegger tells us, however, that our experience is 
always intelligible and matters to us in terms of some EA. This implies that EAs include not just 
highly articulated practical identities but also humbler abilities that aren’t associated with any 
specifiable social role. In fact, on Heidegger’s view, all human abilities are existential—they all 
contribute to our being-in-the-world. Thus, even simple abilities – like drinking, sitting in a 
chair, or getting a better look at something – count as EAs on his view.46 So our EAs lie on a 
continuum from simple bodily skills to the complex social roles taken up in highly structured 
institutional contexts. Each EA contributes to the way an agent understands herself in the world; 
and taken as a whole they constitute the pragmatic self-understanding in terms of which our 
first-person experience, for the most part, is intelligible and matters to us. 
 
The second respect in which the Kosgaard comparison fails is that, for Heidegger, your 
pragmatic self-understanding is not a ‘self-conception’ or a ‘description’ or any other product of 
reflection. Understanding, on Heidegger’s view, means ‘“being able to manage something”, 
“being a match for it”, “being competent to do something”'.47 Thus, for him, self-understanding 
denotes our pre-reflective sense of what we can manage, what we’re a match for, and what 
we’re competent to do. In other words, since understanding denotes skillful action, self-
understanding refers to the sense you have of yourself as someone capable of such action as 
you’re doing it. Self-understanding is not a self-conception or some form of ‘immanent self-
perception’48 but rather an embodied competence in action. Thus, Heidegger rightly notes that 
we spend most of our lives ‘absorbed in the world’49 engaged in pre-reflective action.50 Once an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 She introduces this idea in Korsgaard, C.M. (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge 
University Press, p. 101. For works that relate this notion to Heidegger’s position, see Burch, M. 
(2010). Death and deliberation: Overcoming the decisionism critique of Heidegger's practical 
philosophy. Inquiry, 53(3), 211-234; Crowell, S. (2007). Sorge or Selbstbewusstsein? Heidegger 
and Korsgaard on the sources of normativity. European Journal of Philosophy, 15(3), 315-333; 
Okrent, M. (1999). Heidegger and Korsgaard on human reflection. Philosophical Topics, 27(2), 
47-76. 
45 Korsgaard, C. M. (2009). Self-constitution: Agency, identity, and integrity. OUP Oxford, p. 20. 
46 Some will object to the thought that low-level bodily activities contribute to our pragmatic 
self-understanding; however, such abilities make facets of the world intelligible to us, at times 
affect what matters to us, and in part define who we are in the world. Anyone who doubts that 
such basic bodily abilities contribute to our sense of self might consider discussing the point 
with a person with a disability who lives without some of these abilities. On this view, 
everything about human existence, even our existence in time, can be seen as an ability. For 
look at our temporal abilities and inabilities, see Owen, G. S., Freyenhagen, F., Hotopf, M., & 
Martin, W. (2015). Temporal inabilities and decision-making capacity in depression. 
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 14(1), pp. 163-182.  
47 Heidegger, M. (1927/1962).  Being and Time.  John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson, trans.  
Harper & Row: San Francisco, p. 184. Henceforth referenced as BT. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Heidegger, M. BT, p. 149. 
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agent masters the skills required to participate in the social practices of her community, she can, 
for the most part, glide through the world without explicit reflection. So I can walk from here to 
there, pick up my daughters from school, and make dinner without once deliberating about 
what to do. Again, EAs make SPIA possible.  
 
Finally, before we focus in on the intentional dimension of SPIA, one more aspect of our EAs – 
one Heidegger tends to ignore – merits emphasis: all our skills are embodied skills. This means 
that learning the ropes in a practice always involves educating my body; in particular, it requires 
that I gradually master certain practice-relevant sensorimotor contingencies (SMCs). SMCs are 
the law-like relations between my bodily movements and the sensory input I receive in response 
to those movements. Acquiring any EA requires that I get a grip on the relevant set of SMCs, 
because this bodily competence is partly constitutive of my ability to participate in a practice. 
This is true not only for predominately physical practices like sports but also for largely 
intellectual ones like teaching. For just as I will not be able to skillfully pass a soccer ball if I 
lack the agility and strength required to place my weight on one foot while striking the ball with 
the other, so I will not be able to skillfully communicate with my students if my posture, 
gestures, expressions, mouth, and so on don’t work together towards that end.  So part of 
acquiring an EA in a particular practice is developing the physical know-how that tells me what 
sensory input to expect in response to my specific bodily movements in the relevant context. 
This bodily knowledge builds up over time, becoming increasingly rich and more entrenched 
the more I engage in the practice. Thus, the exercise of a given EA depends on the mastery of 
certain SMCs that associate with a particular network of physiological responses, homeostatic 
regularities, and neurological connections. To use the teaching example one last time, not only 
does my body do important work in the exercise of my teaching skills, but over the years I have 
also built up a network of basic physiological associations with the work. For me, a certain level 
of anxiety, caffeination, rest, and excitement are all associated with teaching to the extent that 
variations in these physiological states can throw off my performance. Thus, a certain bodily 
know-how and a network of physiological associations in part constitute my normative 
expectations as I exercise that EA.  
 
5. Putting the ‘I’ in SPIA 
 
Above I argued that the views of skilled action offered by Dreyfus and traditional DPT don’t 
make SPIA seem sufficiently agential for my purposes. I attempt to show that my view is different 
in §5.1-5.3 by identifying three aspects of SPIA that, on my account, make it robustly 
intentional. 
 
5.1 Guidance Part of what makes SPIA robustly intentional on my account is the fact that it’s 
guided by the norms that govern my EA. The rationale for this claim is as follows. First, I can’t 
intentionally take some pre-reflective action ϕ unless I possess the EA (or skillset) that makes ϕ-
ing possible.51 I could claim to intend to ϕ even though I lack the requisite skills for ϕ-ing, but 
my words would be empty. For instance, I might say that I intend to repair an F-16 jet engine 
tonight, but as things stand, I lack the know-how to make good on that intention. Such an 
intention would at best be a pseudo-intention, words that ring hollow when the time arrives to 
execute that “intention” in action. Moreover, in order to intentionally ϕ at t1, I not only have to 
possess the relevant EA, but that EA has to guide my action—I have to understand what I’m up 
to at t1 in terms of that EA.
 52 To adapt an example from Danto (1981),53 assume, arguendo, that I 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 For an in-depth discussion of this difference between Heidegger and Korsgaard’s views and 
why it matters, see Crowell, S. (2007). Sorge or Selbstbewusstsein? Heidegger and Korsgaard on 
the sources of normativity. European Journal of Philosophy, 15(3), 315-333. 
51 Of course, if ϕ-ing depends on skills I’ve picked up in other practices, I might be able to pull 
off ϕ-ing, but that will only be because I happen to possess the skills that enable me to 
participate in that practice. 
52 Crowell often cashes out this notion of trying in terms of the distinction between acting in 
light of norms and acting merely in accord with them: “trying to be something requires that I be 
able to act not merely in accord with the measures of these roles, but in light of them” (Crowell, 
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have the skills to produce a perfect forgery of Motherwell’s Elegy to the Spanish Republic, no. 
57. Now, if I trip over a tin of paint in a studio at t1, and the spill results in a canvass that is 
indistinguishable from Motherwell’s masterpiece, that act is not intentional, because even 
though I have the skills necessary to make such a copy, I wasn’t exercising them at t1. To extend 
the point, if we recall that exercising an EA entails adhering to the norms that govern it as I 
understand them, it follows that a) my pre-reflective action is intentional at t1 if and only if is 
guided by my understanding of the norms that govern the EA I’m exercising at t1, and, 
conversely, b) anything I do at t1 that isn’t guided by my understanding of those norms must be i) 
a mistake (i.e., something I did intentionally but only because I failed to see it as norm-
discordant), or ii) unintentional behaviour due to non-agential forces. So, for example, if I tackle 
an opponent during a rugby match, even if I do so spontaneously without reflection, that action 
is intentional because it’s guided by the norms of the EA I’m currently exercising. If the same 
collision occurs because another player pushes me from behind, however, that action isn’t 
intentional, because, though consistent with what I’m up to as a rugby player, it’s not guided by 
my understanding of the norms that govern that EA. In summary then, my pre-reflective action is 
intentional at t1 if and only if it is guided by the EA – and thus guided by the norms that govern 
the EA – that I’m exercising at t1. SPIA is properly agential and intentional in part because it 
meets this guidance requirement—it’s guided by an aspect of my agency. 
 
5.2 Non-Observational Practical Knowledge Taking a cue from Elizabeth Anscombe, I also 
want to claim that pre-reflective intentional action is characterized by a certain non-
observational practical knowledge of what I’m up to. As McDowell interprets Anscombe’s 
claim, such practical knowledge is essentially the first-person equivalent to an observer’s 
description of my action. In other words, when watching Lucy do such-and-such, I would have 
observational knowledge that Lucy is doing such-and-such; but when I act intentionally, I have 
non-observational knowledge that “I am doing such-and-such.”54 My Heideggerian approach is 
similar to this but it adds a normative dimension to McDowell’s characterisation of intention-in-
action. In Heidegger’s language, Dasein always takes up a pre-reflective intentional action “in 
terms of a potentiality-for-Being [or EA] for the sake of which it itself is…”55 In other words, 
when I engage in pre-reflective intentional action I always do so for the sake of the EA I’m 
currently exercising. So, for example, when my daughters come downstairs in the morning and I 
make them breakfast, I do so for the sake of being a good dad (as I understand the relevant 
norms). Thus, on this view, the non-observational practical knowledge that accompanies a pre-
reflective intentional action should be expressed as follows: “I am doing such-and-such for-the-
sake-of this EA.” This content isn’t explicitly self-conscious; rather, it’s a non-observational sense 
of what I’m up to, which could be expressed explicitly if I were asked to give an account of 
myself.56 Moreover, this practical knowledge of my intention isn’t as fine-grained as the skilled 
action is fine-tuned to the situation. So the evidence that expert action isn’t a completely 
intellectual affair – e.g., that experts who reflect too much tend to “choke”, that many experts 
can’t recall the details of their actions, and that experts who do try to recall those details tend to 
confabulate – is not obviously in tension with my view. 57 I am not taking the intellectualist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2014, p. 84). I want to avoid this language because the distinction between acting in accord and 
acting in light of norms is a contested one that is difficult to draw. For an illuminating discussion 
of this issue, see Orkent, M. (2016). “Responsiveness to Norms” in Normativity and Naturalism 
in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Vol. 77) edited by Mark Risjord. Routledge. 
53 Danto, A. C. (1981). The Transfiguration of the Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art. Harvard 
University Press. 
54 Ibid., p. 417. To illustrate: if I were passing the salt, an observer might remark, ‘He’s passing 
the salt’; and my corresponding intention in action would be the first-person equivalent, 
namely, ‘I’m passing the salt.’ 
55 [BT, pp. 119/86]. 
56 This tracks with recent work on the reasons-responsive character of skilful action by Peter 
Railton (2009), Julia Annas (2011), David Velleman (2008), and Irene McMullin (forthcoming). 
57 Juan Pablo Bermúdez (2017) Do we reflect while performing skillful actions? Automaticity, 
control, and the perils of distraction, Philosophical Psychology, 30:7, 896-924, DOI 
10.1080/09515089.2017.1325457, pp. 897-898. 
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position that all skilled action is governed by propositional knowledge, such that knowing-how 
is reducible to knowing that. I am only claiming that SPIA is accompanied by a broad non-
observational sense of what I’m up to and to what end.58  
 
But if this practical knowledge isn’t explicit, in what sense am I aware of it? Heidegger answers: 
“The self is there for the Dasein itself without reflection and without inner perception”59 in this 
non-observational way due to a “a mirroring back of the self from things.”60 In other words, in 
SPIA I have this non-observational practical knowledge of what I’m up to in virtue of my 
awareness of the action context and the entities and others therein. To return to the example of 
greeting my daughters in the morning, my non-observational knowledge that I am greeting them 
warmly for the sake of being a good dad (as I understand it) is not something I self-consciously 
monitor but rather something reflected back to me in their own warm responses to my attention. 
So a certain kind of observation is necessary for me to have this kind of practical self-knowledge 
– I have to attend to the relevant features of the context, others, entities, and so on – but no 
further observation is necessary for me to be aware of my own pre-reflective intention. I don’t 
observe or self-consciously monitor my own intention but rather I know it non-observationally, 
because it’s mirrored back to me in contexts, things, and others. It is my activity and interactions 
in the world that tell me what I’m up to, not some act of self-conscious monitoring. This non-
observational practical knowledge of my intention also contributes to making SPIA properly 
agential.  
 
5.3 Normative Sensitivity Finally, another essential trait that makes skilful pre-reflective action 
intentional on my view is its normative sensitivity: SPIA is sensitively attuned to the normatively 
relevant features of the situation. One way to clarify this idea is through an analogy to 
compatibilist theories of free will that account for free action in terms of sensitivity to reasons.61 
The hallmark of these theories is that they eschew the traditional libertarian requirement that an 
act is done freely only when an agent could have done otherwise. As an alternative to such 
leeway freedom, these compatibilists invoke source freedom, claiming than an action is free and 
therefore attributable to an agent only if the actual source of that action is the agent’s own 
reasons-responsiveness. Moreover, such attribution is appropriate only when the agent’s 
reasons-responsive capacities are suitably sensitive to the right range of reasons. In other words, 
the action is attributable to the agent if – holding constant her capacity to respond to reasons – 
in a suitably wide range of situations in which she has sufficient reason to act otherwise, she 
would recognize and respond to those reasons by acting otherwise. If an agent’s reasons-
responsiveness is sensitive in this way, then her action is attributable to her because, as Michael 
McKenna puts it, “the etiology of the act which she actually performed involved springs that 
were sensitive to reasons.”62 This is where I want to draw an analogy. On these compatibilist 
views, an agent’s action is free if its source lies in her suitably sensitive reasons-responsiveness; 
and her reasons-responsiveness is suitably sensitive if she would have acted differently in a 
sufficiently broad range of scenarios wherein she had sufficient reason to do so. Analogously, on 
my view, my pre-reflective action is intentional – and so attributable to me – if its source lies in 
my suitably sensitive skillful responsiveness to the situation; and my skillful responsiveness is 
suitably sensitive if I would have acted differently in a suitably wide range of scenarios in which 
there were sufficient normative considerations that counted in favor of my doing so. Conversely, 
if my response to the situation is rigidly automated and would not differ in a suitably wide range 
of circumstances wherein there were sufficient normative considerations that counted in favour 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 My thinking on this topic has been influenced significantly by Luthra, Y. (2017). Self-Trust and 
Knowledge of Action. The Journal of Philosophy, 114(9), 471-491. 
59 Heidegger, M. (1982). The Basic Problems of Phenomenology BPP. Alfred Hofstadter, trans. 
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982, p. 159. 
60 Ibid., p. 174). 
61 For some of the most influential versions of such a view, see Fischer, J. M., & Ravizza, M. 
(1998). Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility. Cambridge University Press; 
and McKenna, M. (2012). Conversation and responsibility. Oxford University Press. 
62 McKenna, M. (2013). ‘Reasons-responsiveness, agents, and mechanisms’, in Oxford Studies in 
Agency and Responsibility, vol. 1, edited by David Shoemaker, p. 154. 
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of acting otherwise, then my pre-reflective behaviour is not intentional. To vary McKenna’s 
formulation, then, my pre-reflective action is intentional and attributable to me only if the 
etiology of the act I actually perform involves a skilful responsiveness that is sensitive to 
normatively relevant features of the situation.63 
 
But what determines which features of a situation are normatively relevant? The short answer is 
that our EAs do. Every action context presents more phenomena than we can possibly take in; 
there’s no way to be sensitive to every detail. Fortunately, we don’t have to be, because our EAs 
train our attention – to varying degrees across and within individuals – to the features of the 
situation most relevant to the practice we’re currently engaged in. In exercising an EA, then, I 
am always holding myself accountable to the norms of the relevant practice (as I understand 
them), responding to changes in the situation as better or worse in light of those norms, and 
making suitable compensatory adjustments to keep my performance on track. For example, say 
I’m driving my kids to school, and there’s a cyclist sharing my lane. In this situation, I’m 
exercising (at least) two EAs: as 1) a driver trying to observe the rules of the road and 2) a dad 
trying to get his kids to school safely (and on time). Given the EAs I’m exercising, there are 
countless features of the surrounding environment that simply don’t show up for me: the shape 
of a cloud, the frog on the side of the road, the brand of the cyclist’s trousers, etc. Instead, my 
EAs as driver and dad work together to train my attention to the normatively relevant features of 
the situation, i.e., those relevant to driving well and keeping my daughters safe (and punctual). 
These EAs thus focus my attention to the road conditions, the cyclist’s pace, his location in the 
lane, the absence of traffic in the oncoming lane, etc. Taking this all in, I spontaneously respond 
with aversion to the cyclist’s pace, move over into the empty oncoming lane, leaving plenty of 
room for the cyclist when I pass, and speeding up as I do in order to avoid staying too long in 
the oncoming lane. I do all this without explicit reflection. Is it suitably sensitive to the situation 
or merely mindless and automatic? The answer is that it is suitably sensitive if I would have 
responded differently in a suitably wide range of circumstances wherein there were sufficient 
normative considerations that counted in favour of acting otherwise, e.g., had there been a 
Range Rover not far off in the oncoming lane, had I felt too sleepy to execute the maneuver, had 
the sun been in my eyes, and so on. And, again, the idea that I would have responded 
differently implies that my skills were suitably sensitive in doing what I actually did. Of course, 
sensitivity comes in degrees and specifying a cutoff where skills become insufficiently sensitive 
is a tricky business. In light of this, I recommend that we think of sensitivity on a sliding scale 
from actions that are clearly sensitive to those that obviously aren’t.64 And along that sliding 
scale, other things being equal, the greater the sensitivity, the more attributable the action, and 
vice versa.65  
 
Is there any room for the automatic or mandatory implementation of action on this view? As we 
saw, on the account of SPIA offered by DPT, skilled action appears automatic, so to speak, all 
the way down. Does my alternative view invert this and take it to be entirely sensitive? No. Like 
Christensen et al., I endorse a “hybrid” or “mesh” view in which our normatively sensitive 
capacities operate in conjunction with automatic processes “in an intimately meshed 
arrangement.”66 According to Christensen et al., this mesh approach pairs with a hierarchical 
division of control responsibilities. They illustrate this hierarchy with a look at the skill of 
driving, which is convenient for us given the example we just considered:  
 
Higher strategic control involves overall control of the primary skill in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 A full account of this analogy would require that I specify how sensitive one’s skills need to 
be, and I would need to go beyond considerations about intentional action into questions of 
moral responsibility. I leave those matters for another time.  
64 Sherri Roush (forthcoming) makes this point about sliding scale when discussing a different 
kind of sensitivity in a very different context. 
65 This doesn’t mean that my pre-reflective intentional actions always get things right. If the 
driver in front of me turns her lights on and I mistake the new illumination for brake lights, my 
slowing down in response is still intentional, because it’s suitably sensitive to the situation.  
66 Christensen et al. (2016), p. 62. 
	   16	  
relation to its goals. In the case of driving this includes navigation to the 
destination. Situation control involves the control of action in relation to 
the immediate situation. In the case of driving this involves proximal 
control of the car in relation to features of the situation, including 
maneuvers like accelerating to traffic speed, maintaining lane position, 
maintaining a safe distance to other cars, changing lanes, and so on. 
Implementation control involves performing actions that achieve situation 
control, which in the case of driving includes steering, accelerating, 
braking, changing gears, and so on.67 
 
According to Christensen et al., automation is strongest – though not complete – for 
implementation control, while situation control and higher strategic control don’t automate 
well, because, in my terms, these aspects of control need to be sensitive to the normatively 
relevant features of the situation. That is, implementation control can automate because it 
“involves relatively stable relations (e.g. brake to slow down)”, but when it comes to situation 
control and higher strategic control “the relation of action to context is usually complex and 
variable” and so it can’t be easily automated.68 In other words, situation control and higher 
strategic control need to be normatively sensitive to the situation in order “to manage the 
variable features of action, tracking the overall task and the structure of the situation, and 
adjusting action appropriately.”69 So when I pass that cyclist on the way to my daughters’ 
school, my normatively sensitive capacities keep the action consistent with my strategic goals 
and attend to the relevant details of the particular situation, while my steering, accelerating, and 
gear changing are mostly implemented automatically. In my terms, strategic and situation 
control are rather normatively sensitive, while implementation control is barely so. Again, such 
sensitivity comes in degrees, and Christensen et al. argue that it tends to vary with the difficulty 
and novelty of the task. However, on this mesh approach, skilled action always involves a 
combination of normative sensitivity and automatic implementation. 
 
To sum up §5.1-5.3, on my account, SPIA is robustly agential and intentional because it’s i) 
guided by my EA, ii) accompanied by non-observational practical knowledge of my intention, 
and iii) sensitive to normatively relevant features of the situation.70 These three characteristics 
put the ‘I’ in SPIA. 
 
5.4 Strangers to Ourselves71 
 
One might object that my approach is far too sanguine about the possibility of identifying which 
pre-reflective actions are intentional. After all, a large and by now familiar body of 
psychological evidence suggests that we often lack insight into our own intentions,72 and so the 
fact that what we do appears to flow from our suitably sensitive skillful responsiveness to the 
situation does not guarantee that said responsiveness is in fact the source of our action. In other 
words, we could interpret a good deal of our actions as intentional in terms of the account just 
offered, when those actions are in fact attributable to non-conscious mechanisms that 
completely bypass our intentional agency.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Ibid., p. 49. 
68 Ibid., p. 49. 
69 Ibid. P. 50. 
70 I am not interested in entering debates about whether non-human animals can act in light of 
norms. However, I will say that, according to this account, if non-human animals do act in light 
of norms, then they do so i) with a sense that failure is possible and ii) in a way that is sensitively 
attuned to the normatively relevant features of the situation. 
71 This section heading is a reference to Wilson, T. D. (2004). Strangers to ourselves. Harvard 
University Press, which summarizes some of the empirical psychological research referenced in 
this section.  
72 For recent philosophical work that draws on this literature to puncture our faith in the notion 
that we’re reliably in touch with the actual springs of our action, see Doris (2002, 2015) and 
Carruthers (2009, 2011). 
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I have two responses to this type of objection. First, the account above isn’t meant to offer a 
practical criterion for determining which pre-reflective actions are in fact intentional; it’s an 
account of what SPIA is, not a guide for spotting it in the wild. Secondly, regarding the practical 
matter of determining the intentional status of particular pre-reflective actions, I would invoke 
Tyler Burge’s “acceptance principle,” which holds that “a person is entitled to accept as true 
something that is presented as true and that is intelligible to him, unless there are stronger 
reasons not to do so.”73 To apply the principle here: my sense that my pre-reflective action is 
attributable to my suitably sensitive skillful responsiveness to a situation should be accepted as 
(defeasible) evidence for the intentional status of that action, unless there are stronger reasons to 
not do so.74   
 
5.5 What role for deliberation? 
 
One last point I need to clarify before offering my more detailed account of akrasia as SPIA is 
the role of deliberation on this approach. This issue is too complex to do full justice to it here, so 
I will only try to capture the essentials. In keeping with my Heideggerian approach, I don’t 
conceive of deliberative judgment as an independent mental faculty or a raw computational 
power that evaluates my life, so to speak, ‘sideways-on’;75 rather, like Crowell76 and Gallagher77, 
I understand deliberation as an existential ability or skill. Deliberation is a social practice; the 
norms that govern it vary across populations (culturally and historically); the ability to 
participate competently in that practice requires certain skills governed by those norms; and 
deliberative skill levels vary across individuals and within individuals over time and across 
contexts. Finally, like most social practices, deliberation meets a human need: when I confront a 
problem of sufficient difficulty, I use my deliberative skills to try to resolve that problem.  
 
This might remind the reader of Dreyfus’s view, but it’s importantly different. According to 
Dreyfus, we spend most of our time engaged in mindless immersed coping, and we only 
explicitly deliberate in the face of a problem that demands flexible reasoning. Against this 
picture, again, I endorse a mesh theory: our normative capacities are always up and active, 
whether we’re engaged in skilled action or deliberation. All situations require thought; some just 
require more than others. So my view recognizes that there are some situations where 
spontaneous, normatively appropriate action is not possible, because the problem one faces is 
too novel or difficult; and in these cases we engage in deliberative problem solving, while our 
other normatively sensitive EAs continue to search for a suitable response. But my view does not 
construe deliberative problem solving as radically discontinuous with skilled action. On a mesh 
view, the intensity of thought required for action increases along a continuum from easy 
conditions wherein we engage relatively effortless skilled action, to novel and/or difficult 
conditions that require more effortful thought, to very difficult situations that require intensive 
and sometimes protracted deliberative problem solving.78 The difference along this continuum is 
not a difference in kind but a difference of degree and intensity. Deliberative skill, on this 
Heideggerian view, is still a skill; it’s not a radically different way of being in the world; it’s an 
intensification of the thought that accompanies everyday action. So I don’t embrace the 
dichotomy between mindless action and explicit reflection defended by Dreyfus and DPT; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Burge, Tyler (1993). “Content Preservation,” Philosophical Review 102: 457–88. 
74 Here I take a cue from Barbara Montero (2016) who invokes Burge’s principle for similar 
reasons in Thought in Action: Expertise and the Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press. 
75 I use McDowell’s (1994: p. 153) expression ‘sideways-on’ in a kind of analogy here: just as 
we can’t stand outside the conceptual order to evaluate its normativity from the outside, 
deliberators can’t stand outside their lives but rather deliberate from within it.  
76 For an illuminating discussion of deliberation situated in Heidegger’s ontology of care, see 
chapter 9 of Crowell, S. (2013). Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 191-213. 
77 Gallagher, S. (2017). Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind. Oxford University Press, p. 
203. 
78 Christensen et al. (2016) describe this continuity with great clarity on pp. 52-53. 
	   18	  
rather, I see normatively sensitive thought as an almost ubiquitous feature of human activity that 
takes the form of deliberation under certain circumstances.  
 
What does deliberation look like when we think of it as a skill? To a large extent, to deliberate is 
to enact in thought what we ordinarily do pre-reflectively in action. In SPIA, we skilfully respond 
to the situation in light of the norms that govern the EA we’re currently exercising. But when we 
encounter a situation where a spontaneous response isn’t forthcoming, we use our deliberative 
skills to identify a suitable response. Typically, such deliberation isn’t a highly abstract process 
that appeals to explicit principles; rather, for the most part, it’s an imaginative process that 
involves hypothetically “trying out” different action possibilities until we find one that seems 
fitting. In other words, in SPIA we spontaneously seize on an action possibility; and in 
deliberation we try out different action possibilities in order to find one that seems fitting given 
the current circumstances. And such actions seem fitting to the extent that they appear 
consistent with the norms that govern the EA one wants to exercise. Deliberation thus involves 
thinking about the normative landscape of affordances that we typically respond to 
spontaneously. And such thought varies along a continuum from the fairly concrete imaginative 
“enaction”79 of different action possibilities to the evaluation of such possibilities in light of 
abstract principles and/or cost-benefit analysis. Regardless of the level of abstraction, however, 
the ultimate goal of deliberation is to find a fitting action to be taken up by my pre-reflective 
agency. 
  
Typically, deliberative skill does this by referring to the norms that govern the EA I was 
exercising at the moment the problem arises. For example, when I’m spending time with my 
daughters in a pre-reflective mode, I do so in light of what I take to be the norms of parenting. 
And when my daughters throw me off balance, compelling me to deliberate about how best to 
respond, I also deliberate in light of my EA as a parent and my understanding of its governing 
norms. In the typical case, then, my intentional action and deliberation are structured and 
guided by the same EA before and after the breakdown. And deliberative skill settles on an 
action meant to get me back in action.80 Ultimately, then, deliberative skill provides a kind of 
support in the face of situations where my skillful pre-reflective agency fails to manage a 
problem spontaneously. So, whereas judgment internalism assigns the faculty of evaluative 
judgment an executive role in the agent’s mental economy, my view sees deliberative skill 
playing a support role. Deliberative skill does not provide executive orders but rather 
recommendations about how to proceed.  
  
6. Akrasia as SPIA  
 
Now that I have explained what makes SPIA properly intentional, I can flesh out the preliminary 
sketch of akrasia as SPIA that I gave in §2. I’ll begin with a formal description and then add 
detail with a few examples.  
 
Akrasia results from a three-part process: 1) a problem disrupts your pre-reflective intentional 
action and forces you to deliberate about how to go on; 2) your deliberative skill recommends a 
plan of action that seems likely to resolve the disruption; but then 3) you spontaneously exercise 
some other EA and engage in SPIA that goes against that recommendation. Such akratic breaks 
with our better judgment can take a variety of forms. For example,  
 
Akrasia1) Sometimes we deliberate and reach a judgment about what to do, but at the 
same time our skillful responsiveness detects different normatively relevant features of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Again, see Gallagher (2017) for a helpful discussion of the enactive nature of the imagination. 
80 This is just the typical case. Such disruptions can also motivate me to engage in second-order 
deliberation about the legitimacy of the norms that regulate some EA, and they can also lead me 
to engage in third-order deliberation wherein I consider reconfiguring my life as a whole. For 
more on this kind of ‘deep deliberation’, see Burch, M. (2010). Death and deliberation: 
Overcoming the decisionism critique of Heidegger's practical philosophy. Inquiry, 53(3), 211-
234. 
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the situation, and then, in light of this detection, we engage in SPIA against our better 
judgment. 
 
Akrasia2) In a diachronic version of Akrasia1, we also sometimes we deliberate at t1 and 
reach a judgment about what to do at t2, and then when t2 arrives, our skillful 
responsiveness detects some normatively relevant feature(s) of the situation that a) 
weren’t in view at t1, b) took on a different valence in the interval between t1 and t2, or c) 
some combination of a) and b); and at t2 we respond sensitively to these newly 
emergent normative differences by engaging in SPIA against our better judgment from 
t1.  
 
Akrasia3) Another common source of akratic behavior is ambivalence: sometimes we’re 
deeply ambivalent in a way that our deliberative skill fails to appreciate, such that 
deliberation recommends one action possibility while on a pre-reflective level we prefer 
another; and so we engage in SPIA against our better judgment.   
 
This list is not exhaustive, but any other form of akrasia as SPIA that we could add to it would 
share the same basic ingredients: my deliberative skill points in one direction on the basis of 
normatively relevant considerations, and some other EA responds to the situation differently, 
because it is sensitive to different normative considerations (or to the same considerations, but in 
a different way). 
 
Now some examples. First, take Gina, a lawyer working on a brief for a major client. Running 
flat out to meet her commitments, Gina fears she won’t finish on time. Then, in the midst of a 
stressful day, her partner Ella calls in need of emotional support, asking Gina for an hour of her 
time. Gina deliberates about what to do and judges that she ought to turn Ella down and finish 
the brief. Then – without revising that judgment – she goes to see Ella anyway. From the 
perspective of DAM’s judgment internalist, Gina irrationally violates the deliverances of her 
evaluative judgment—not intentionally, but rather due to a lack of self-control. On my view, 
however, it’s possible that Gina acts intentionally against her better judgment.  
 
How should we interpret her action on my view? To begin, we should note that Gina’s action 
fits the three-step pattern of akrasia described in the above sketch: 1) Ella’s call disrupts Gina’s 
pre-reflective action and forces her to deliberate. 2) Receiving the call at work, when she’s 
intensely focused on an important brief, Gina’s deliberation is shaped largely by normative 
considerations associated with her EA as an attorney, and so she judges that she ought to keep 
working. However, 3) her skillful responsiveness to the situation is sensitive to and moved by 
the claims associated with her EA as Ella’s partner, and so she engages in SPIA and, against her 
better judgment, heads out to see Ella. On this interpretation, then, Gina’s action is an instance 
of Akrasia1: she deliberates and reaches a judgment about what to do, but at the same time her 
skillful responsiveness detects other normatively relevant features of the situation; and then, in 
light of this detection, she engages in SPIA against her better judgment.  
 
The second thing to note is that, on this interpretation, Gina’s action has all the hallmarks of 
robustly intentional pre-reflective action identified in §5.1-5.3: it’s guided by her EA as Ella’s 
partner, accompanied by a practical non-observational knowledge of what she’s up to, and 
sensitive to normatively relevant considerations associated with being a good partner (as she 
understands it).  Interpreted this way, then, her action is properly intentional. Her judgment that 
she ought to do her work might hang around at the back of her mind – “My boss is going to kill 
me!” – but it lacks the normative force to prevent her from going to see Ella. 
 
Explaining exactly why Gina acts this way would require fine-grained insights into her personal 
psychology, but two broad points about her motivations seem fairly uncontroversial. First, it 
seems fair to say that, at the moment she acts, Gina prioritizes her partner’s emotional wellbeing 
over her own current work commitments. Second, although there’s certainly an affective 
dimension at play in Gina’s decision, it would be artificial to describe what she does in terms of 
succumbing to an excessive desire. Indeed, it would be psychologically flat-footed to see her 
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conflict as a simple contest between reason and desire. At least at the moment she acts, Gina is 
motivated by the fact that she cares more about her partner’s wellbeing than finishing her brief 
on time, and such caring isn’t a brute desire pushing her around—it’s an affective and evaluative 
orientation associated with an EA that matters to her. So it’s not some raw desire demanding 
satisfaction that moves Gina to action but rather a concern for Ella and for a significant part of 
Gina’s own self-understanding. That is, Ella’s wellbeing is at stake in the decision, and so is 
Gina’s EA as Ella’s partner. 
 
For my second example, I borrow and adapt Marilyn Friedman’s description of an alienated, 
1950s housewife.81 Call her Betty.82 Betty believes that “a woman’s place is in the home” and 
yet she finds herself wanting more from life, such as intellectual stimulation, a career, and a 
social life. One day her friend invites her to attend a lecture at the local university. She wants to 
go, but after reflecting on her “proper place” in the world, she judges that she has good and 
sufficient reason to stay home. Then, without revising her judgment, she goes anyway. From the 
perspective of DAM, it seems, the best interpretation of Betty’s behaviour is that she succumbs 
to an urge she lacks the strength to resist. And Friedman’s description of Betty’s psychology 
recommends this interpretation. As she describes it, the depressed homemaker is torn by a 
contest between her principles “at the highest level” and her motivations “at lower levels”83. So, 
on Friedman’s account, it would seem that Betty’s principles simply lose out to low-level desires 
(or urges) she’s too weak to control.  
 
My view interprets the case differently. As with Gina, it seems artificial to describe Betty’s 
conflict as a contest of reason vs. desire, or high- vs. low-level elements of her psychology. It 
seems more apt, rather, to say that she’s torn between conflicting elements of her self-
understanding. On the one hand, she understands herself as a homemaker, and that EA matters 
to her a good deal. She not only takes pride in it and holds deep beliefs about its importance, 
but it’s also tied up with other important EAs – e.g., being a mother, adhering to a particular 
religious practice, and so on – such that putting her homemaker identity at risk puts these other 
aspects of her self at risk too. On the other hand, growing up, Betty received an education, and 
through that process she developed skills that made her a participant in the life of the mind. In 
other words, her education left her with another EA that still matters to her, even though it has 
been effectively stifled in her adult life. So Betty’s conflict isn’t a clash between reflectively 
endorsed higher principles and low-level motivations; it’s a contest between incompatible 
possibilities associated with different EAs that both matter to her. That is, her conflict is between 
her commitments as a homemaker and her interests as an educated person.  
 
Instead of DAM’s story about Betty’s principles losing out to an urge, then, we can describe her 
akratic behaviour as SPIA taken against her better judgment. Her action fits the three-part 
process of akrasia:  1) a friend’s invitation disrupts her everyday pre-reflective action as a 
housewife and motivates her to deliberate; 2) she deliberates in light of her role as a homemaker 
and judges – all things considered – that she ought to stay home; but then, 3) without revising 
her judgment, she acts spontaneously in light of her EA as an educated person with an interest 
in the life of the mind. And her pre-reflective action is intentional because 1) in attending the 
lecture her action is guided by her understanding of the norms that govern her EA as an 
educated person, 2) she has non-observational practical knowledge of her own intention, and 3) 
her action is sensitive to the features of the situation that are normatively relevant in light of her 
EA as an educated person. Thus, Betty’s case looks like an instance of Akrasia3: she’s deeply 
ambivalent in a way that her deliberative skill fails to appreciate, such that her deliberation 
recommends she stay home like a “good homemaker”, while on a pre-reflective level she 
prefers to go; and so she engages in SPIA against her better judgment. Explaining why Betty is 
blind to her own ambivalence would take us too far afield into issues of oppression and false 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81  Friedman, M. A. (1986). Autonomy and the split-level self. The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy, 24(1), 19-35.   
82 In honour of Betty Friedan. 
83  Friedman, M. A. (1986). Autonomy and the split-level self. The Southern Journal of 
Philosophy, 24(1), p. 30.  
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consciousness to explore here, so we will just recall that deliberation is a social practice and 
thus societal pressures can go a long way in shaping what shows up as a relevant reason in the 
deliberative process. At any rate, when Betty goes out, her explicit judgment and feelings of guilt 
and social transgression might tug at her conscience, but not forcefully enough to keep her 
home that night.  
 
Finally, let’s turn to a classic example in the discourse on akrasia: the akratic smoker. Tonight 
Black has plans to meet up with his old pal Jones. Back in grad school, the two primarily passed 
time talking philosophy over beer and cigarettes. Black has since quit smoking, but he knows 
that Jones hasn’t, and he feels a wave of temptation to take the night off from abstaining so he 
can relive the good old days. This temptation prompts deliberation. Black thinks about how long 
it took him to quit smoking, how hard it was, how proud he is of his ten-year stint as a non-
smoker, and how much his partner hated his smoking back in grad school. He doesn’t want to 
break that streak and he also worries that one night off could snowball into a full-blown habit. 
Thus, Black, upon reflection, judges all things considered that he shouldn’t smoke that night and 
resolves to abstain. Once he’s out at the pub and two pints in, however, Black starts to 
experience a motivational shift. Memories of his grad school days and the buzzy satisfactions of 
smoking come cascading back, and, without further deliberation, Black acts against his better 
judgment and lights up.  
 
This kind of classic case is where DAM’s judgment internalism really seems to shine. After all, 
the conflict does look like a battle between the Black’s deliberative judgment and a desire to 
smoke that eventually defeats him. Black deliberates before his night out, forms an all-things-
considered judgment that he ought not smoke, and then the desire to smoke chips away at him 
until it derails his rational self-control. It sure does look that way. The only problem is that this 
account doesn’t actually explain the phenomenon of interest. What we want to understand is a 
case in which Black intentionally acts against his better judgment. But, as we already saw, from 
DAM’s point of view, strict akrasia – acting freely and intentionally against one’s own better 
judgment – is impossible. So, according to DAM, Black’s failure can’t be strictly akratic. If we 
find that unsatisfying – if we think that Black could act intentionally against his better judgment 
in this classic case – then we’ll have to look beyond DAM for an explanation.  
 
Let’s consider this example from the standpoint of my existential-phenomenological approach. 
First of all, on my view, smoking is an EA. It’s a practice; there are norms that govern it; you can 
fail to do it properly (e.g., smoking yourself sick); being a smoker defines part of who you are in 
the world; and, like all EAs, becoming a smoker requires mastering certain SMCs that associate 
with a network of physiological responses, homeostatic regularities, and neurological 
connections. Moreover, this bodily network associated with the EA, unfortunately, doesn’t 
simply go away because Black doesn’t smoke for ten years. The associative network is etched in 
his body-brain system, and environmental triggers can activate that network, motivating 
approach behavior and a renewed interest in exercising his dormant EA.84 Secondly, by quitting, 
Black has acquired another EA, namely, the ability to abstain from smoking. This is a practical 
skill, which, among other things, involves avoiding triggers, shifting his attention away from 
temptations, fighting temptations when it’s not possible to shift his attention, resolving not to 
give in to temptation, not celebrating abstinence victories with indulgence, seeking support from 
his partner when he feels weak, substituting smoking for other pleasurable skillful behaviours, 
and so on.  
 
This puts Black’s predicament in a different light. When he imagines his evening out with Jones, 
he’s tempted to smoke, which prompts deliberation. And when he deliberates, he imagines 
using his skill for abstinence to ward off temptation that evening, and he reflects on how that 
skill is nested in mutually reinforcing relations with other significant EAs, e.g., he abstains from 
smoking to care for his health, to maintain his happy marriage, to set a good example for his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 For a helpful discussion of how sensorimotor theory explains the approach bias addicts 
display towards their drug of choice, see Fridland, E., & Wiers, C. E. (2017). Addiction and 
embodiment. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1-28. 
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kids, and so on. Smoking just does not fit with who he is in the world, while abstaining does. So 
he judges, all things considered, that he ought not smoke and resolves not to. But that night 
when he’s out with Jones, he faces one associative trigger after another—the pub context, the 
taste of beer, the easing of inhibition, the rush of intoxication, easy conversation with an old 
friend, and the rich history of memories of being out with Jones, talking philosophy over beer 
and cigarettes. Black’s official deliberative recommendation about what to do – i.e., “Don’t 
smoke!” – remains, but in the face of these associative triggers his skillful responsiveness 
becomes sensitive to other features of the situation that count in favour of smoking, and 
eventually he engages in SPIA against his better judgment. And this isn’t a matter of some 
externalized desire derailing his capacity for rational self-control. He acts intentionally: 1) his 
action is guided by his EA as a smoker, 2) he acts with a practical non-observational knowledge 
of his intention to smoke, and 3) his skillful responsiveness is suitably sensitive to normatively 
relevant features of the situation, e.g., that he enjoys smoking, that he wants to relax, and that 
smoking would allow him to quit working on abstinence and to engage fully with his friend.  
 
Regarding point 3), one might object that Black’s skillful responsiveness isn’t suitably sensitive to 
the situation, given that he acts against the many normatively relevant considerations identified 
by his deliberative skill. But the fact that he thought the normative considerations stacked up 
one way at t1 doesn’t bind him to seeing things that way at t2. Black’s akratic smoking is an 
instance of Akrasia2: he deliberates at t1 and reaches a judgment about what to do at t2, and then 
when t2 arrives, his skillful responsiveness detects some normatively relevant features about 
smoking that weren’t in view at t1 and others that took on a different valence in the interval 
between t1 and t2; and so at t2 he responds sensitively to these emergent features of the situation 
by engaging in SPIA against his better judgment from t1.
85 Thus, Black’s pre-reflective action is 
suitably sensitive at t2, i.e., the etiology of the act he actually performs involves a skillful 
responsiveness that is sensitive to normatively relevant features of the situation.  
 
7. More externalist woes?   
 
One aspect of this account that readers might object to is the idea that EAs can function 
independently of deliberative skill. This is once again a version of an objection raised against 
externalism; in that context, it sometimes takes the form of a reductio:  
 
1) Externalism holds that akrasia is possible because judgment and the will are 
functionally independent, and this independence allows the agent’s will to act against 
his better judgment.  
2) Moreover, since such acts are intentional, the agent is responsible for them.  
3) Critics then extend 1): if the will is independent and so can act against the agent’s 
judgment in some cases, then it’s in principle possible that it could do so systematically.  
4) Moreover, given 2), if the agent’s will were to depart systematically from his judgment, 
the agent would be responsible for those actions too.  
5) It would be absurd to view an agent who acted systematically against his better 
judgment as a normal agent who was responsible for his behavior.  
6) Therefore, externalism entails an absurd possibility.  
 
My concern here is not the force of this reductio vis-à-vis externalism but rather whether it 
applies equally to my view. If the skillful responsiveness of a normal agent can depart from the 
recommendations of his deliberative skill sometimes, isn’t it possible that this could happen 
systematically in a normal agent? If so, doesn’t my view entail an absurd possibility?  
 
I don’t think so. The reason this criticism has teeth when brought against externalism is that the 
functionally independent will identified by that view has no substantive connection to our 
actual agency. It’s just a sheer power to act. If such a will can part ways with judgment 
sometimes, then, indeed, it’s unclear why it couldn’t do so systematically. Moreover, it’s hard to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Sometimes it is the dubious character of our so-called better judgment itself that our skillful 
responsiveness detects and spontaneously acts against. 
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see why externalism would hold that it’s normal for the will to do its own thing in some cases, 
but pathological for it to do so systematically. For the sake of time, I’ll bypass the externalist’s 
answer to this objection and focus on my own. 
 
On my view, the normative expectation is that agents act in accord with their deliberative 
judgment most of the time, but not always. They should act in accord with their judgment most 
of the time because a) the raison d’être of deliberative skill is to find a fitting action in response 
to a practical problem, and b) deliberative skill and our other EAs are sensitive to normative 
considerations in the same self-world constellation. Thus, if my EAs are all functioning properly 
and are sensitive to the same constellation of normatively relevant features of a situation, then 
the deliverances of my deliberative skill should, for the most part, track with the responses of my 
other EAs and vice versa. However, the self-world constellation that my EAs are sensitive to is 
extremely complex. Thus, it’s hard for any EA – including deliberative skill – to bring all the 
relevant features of the self and world into view. So we should also expect that sometimes our 
deliberative skill and other EAs will i) detect different normatively relevant features of the 
situation, ii) weigh the same features differently, or some combination of i) and ii). And this 
means that we should expect agents to sometimes part ways with their better judgment. Thus, as 
I’ve argued throughout, in a normal agent we should expect the link between deliberative 
judgment and action to be tight but defeasible. Moreover, if an agent systematically fails to act 
in accord with his judgment, we ought to suspect that something has gone terribly awry. Either 
the agent’s deliberative skill is insufficiently sensitive to relevant reasons, like certain individuals 
with traumatic brain injury who systematically fail to make use of information about past 
behavior when making decisions about the future;86 or the agent suffers from some kind of deep-
seated ambivalence, like persons with extreme anorexia nervosa who tell their doctors that they 
want to live but categorically refuse to eat;87 or some EA has lost its normative sensitivity and 
become compulsive, as appears to happen in some cases of addiction.88 Whatever the specifics 
of the case, on my view, no one who systematically acted against her better judgment could 
ever present as a normally functioning agent.   
 
8. Rational Akrasia and the Paradox of Irrationality  
 
In the wider literature on akrasia, my account most resembles the views of Davidson89 and 
Mele90, because they also i) argue that an agent can intentionally act against her better judgment 
and ii) try to avoid embracing a full-blown externalism that severs the ties between judgment 
and action. In other words, they also posit a tight but defeasible link between judgment and 
action. However, our views differ in that they preserve the traditional idea that akrasia is 
intrinsically irrational, while I argue that akratic action is sensitive to normatively relevant 
features of a situation. This section explores that difference.  
 
I begin with a brief characterization of Davidson and Mele’s respective views. Davidson 
establishes the possibility of akrasia by drawing a distinction between all-things-considered 
judgments and all-out judgments. The crux of this distinction is that an all-things-considered 
judgment, which he identifies with the agent’s better judgment, is conditional, whereas an all-
out judgment is unconditional. Thus, he argues, the problem with the incontinent (or akratic) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86  This example was inspired by Gareth Owen, Fabian Freyenhagen and Wayne Martin, 
“Assessing Decision-Making Capacity after Brain Injury:  A Phenomenological Approach,” 
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87 For a helpful discussion of such ambivalence, see Martin, W. (2017). “Human rights and 
human experience in eating disorders,” The Journal of Psycho-Social Studies 10:2 (2017); 111-
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agent is that while she judges all things considered that she has reason to A, she cannot commit 
herself to an all-out judgment in favour of A-ing. That is, she can’t transition from a conditional 
judgment – e.g., ‘All things considered, I have most reason to A’ – to an all-out unconditional 
commitment to A. Instead, she decides to B, even though she judges she has more reason to A. 
As Davidson sees it, then, akratic acts are intentional but irrational. And they’re irrational 
because they violate the principle that we ought to “perform the action judged best on the basis 
of all available relevant reasons”.91 Moreover, he claims, since the agent acts against her own 
better judgment, she is irrational by her own lights, and she therefore sees her action as 
‘essentially surd’.92 As Sarah Paul puts it, for Davidson, “if one sincerely judges that A is all-
things-considered the thing to do, there is something inexplicable about then proceeding 
intentionally to do something other than A.”93 
 
Like Davidson, Mele also attenuates but does not sever the link between judgment and action. 
On his view, an agent engages in akratic action when his evaluative assessment of an object 
fails to align with the motivational strength of his desire for that object. I’ll illustrate Mele’s view 
here with an example from John Heil, wherein the relevant “object” of my evaluative 
assessment and desire is an action:  
 
I have a strong desire to insult Wayne, a student whom I have detected 
yawning surreptitiously during a lecture on self-control. I judge that, all things 
considered, it would be best not to insult Wayne, nevertheless I succumb to my 
urge and do it.94  
 
Mele’s theory would explain this example as follows. Relying on my judgment, I assess the 
possibility of insulting Wayne and find it an ill-advised, shameful abuse of my position. So I 
decide not to do it. But then the motivational strength of my desire to insult Wayne suddenly 
spikes. And since this happens without my “assessment of the goodness of…[not insulting 
Wayne] also spiking dramatically”, I experience a “motivation-evaluation misalignment”: I 
judge it best not to insult Wayne “while being more strongly motivated” to really blast him.95 So 
I insult him, against my better judgment, and, according to Mele, this is a “free, sane, intentional 
action”.96 
 
The views of Davidson and Mele are extremely influential because they get so many things 
right; however, as I see it, they share a shortcoming that my view tries to improve on. That 
common shortcoming is this: on both their views it’s unclear why we should see an akratic 
action as intentional. To begin with Davidson’s view, if I see acting on my all-out judgment as 
essentially surd, because it goes against my own practical reasoning, why do I intentionally act 
on it? An appeal to my judgment’s all-out character here would only beg the question. What 
makes an all-out judgment an all-out judgment if it’s not a normative consideration that I’m 
somehow sensitive to? Isn’t the element of my psychology that makes my all-out judgment 
causally efficacious here just a desire, pushing me around? And if that’s the case, what’s the 
actual difference between Davidson’s view and judgment internalism? My worry about Mele’s 
view is similar. I agree that it’s fair to characterize akratic actions as involving a kind of 
evaluation-motivation misalignment. But I don’t think Mele adequately explains why such a 
misalignment results in free, intentional, and uncompelled action. For on Mele’s account, it 	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95 Mele, A. R. (2012). Backsliding: Understanding weakness of will. Oxford University Press, p. 
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seems possible to see the akratic actor as a victim who is not guided – but rather assailed – by 
the motivational force of his desire. Consider the example wherein I insulted Wayne: if a sudden 
surge in the motivational force of my desire causes me to insult Wayne, does it make sense to 
see my action as free and intentional? Put otherwise, does it not make equal sense to argue, with 
an internalist like Watson, that a spike in motivational force that causes me to act against my 
better judgment sounds a lot like a powerful desire derailing my judgment? The point seems 
finely balanced. In both cases, then, it can be difficult to distinguish these views from judgment 
internalism. 
 
Davidson and Mele might respond that the alleged problem I’ve identified here is not a bug but 
a feature of their views. The akratic agent acts against what she simultaneously takes the balance 
of reasons to be, and so any explanation of why she does so must see her intentional action as 
irrational and to that extent inexplicable. In other words, if we make akrasia too explicable, we 
lose our grip on its irrationality. Davidson calls this the “paradox of irrationality”: 
 
The underlying paradox of irrationality, from which no theory can entirely 
escape, is this: if we explain it too well, we turn it into a concealed form of 
rationality; while if we assign incoherence too glibly, we merely 
compromise our ability to diagnose irrationality by withdrawing the 
background of rationality needed to justify any diagnosis at all.97 
 
On this line of reasoning, then, what I’m complaining about is just how well Davidson and 
Mele capture akrasia’s irrationality. They don’t explain akrasia too well. They don’t, like me, 
want to make sense of akrasia, because akrasia is irrational and therefore ultimately 
inexplicable. They also don’t assign incoherence too glibly, because they don’t want to 
withdraw the background of rationality in human action like externalism arguably does. In this 
case, the relevant feature of that background is the ordinary, intimate relation between judgment 
and action. Seen in this light, my criticism is just a failure to appreciate the way Davidson and 
Mele do justice to the paradox of irrationality. 
 
Some authors challenge this view by identifying cases where akratic action in fact seems 
rational. The best-known cases are Bennett’s Huck Finn, which was later taken up by McIntyre, 
and Arpaly’s Emily.98 For brevity’s sake, we’ll focus on the Emily case. Emily, a depressed PhD 
candidate, finds herself increasingly miserable in her chemistry graduate program and wants to 
quit, but every time she deliberates on the matter, she decides to press on. In this example, as 
Arpaly sets it up, the objective balance of reasons clearly falls on the side of quitting—Emily’s 
desire to quit is demonstrably more rational than her decision to stay. Thus, when she quits her 
program one day on an impulse, Emily, according to Arpaly, acts rationally against her better 
judgment: “propelled exclusively by her feelings, she quits the program, calling herself lazy and 
irrational but also experiencing a (to her) inexplicable sense of relief.”99 Years later, however, 
she comes to see her choice as the rational thing to do at the time. The standard response to this 
case is to insist that Emily’s akrasia, even if it improves her life, is still irrational. For even if the 
objective balance of reasons points towards quitting, Emily’s action violates what she, by her 
own lights, takes the balance of reasons to be. This is a strong objection, but you can also see 
why Arpaly might push back, arguing that even if it’s irrational for Emily to act against her own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Davidson, D. (1982): “Paradoxes of irrationality”, in R. Wollheim and J. Hopkins (eds.), 
Philosophical Essays on Freud, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 303. This is cited 
and accompanied by an illuminating discussion in in Zheng, Y. (2001). Akrasia, picoeconomics, 
and a rational reconstruction of judgment formation in dynamic choice. Philosophical studies, 
104(3), p. 231.  
98  Bennett, J. (1974). "The conscience of Huckleberry Finn", Philosophy, 49, pp. 123-34; 
McIntyre, A. (1990). "Is akratic action always irrational?", in Rorty andn O. Flanagan (eds) 
Identity, Character, and Morality. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 379-400; Arpaly, N. (2000). On 
acting rationally against one's best judgment. Ethics, 110(3), 488-513. 
99 Arpaly, N. (2000). On acting rationality against one’s best judgment. Ethics, 110, p. 504.  
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better judgment, it’s even more irrational for her to go on making herself miserable in a PhD 
program to which she isn’t well-suited. Thus, on balance, her akratic action is rational, and, 
ultimately, she comes to see this fact by her own lights. 
 
My view takes a similar direction of travel. Like Arpaly, I also maintain that a given case of 
akrasia can be more rational than sticking to your judgment. Think of our depressed homemaker 
Betty: in her case, akratically going out certainly seems more rational than enkratically 
remaining a prisoner in her own home. But there are at least two important differences between 
my view and Arpaly’s. First, we have different theories of action. Arpaly is interested in 
unpacking how Emily’s akratic action is “propelled exclusively by her feelings”, whereas my 
view would explain what she does in terms of her suitably sensitive skillful responsiveness to the 
particular situation. What that skill would be in Emily’s case isn’t straightforward, and I’d 
probably need more information to say definitively. However, care of the self is a social 
practice, whereby we look after our physical, moral, and emotional wellbeing, and it seems to 
me that Emily’s skill at caring for herself was suitably sensitive to the situation when she left her 
PhD program. The second important difference between my view and Arpaly’s is that, while she 
allows for an occasional akratic action that is more rational than a particular better judgment, I 
maintain that in every case of SPIA taken against one’s better judgment, the action is rational in 
some sense. That is, even when a better judgment is objectively better – i.e., when sticking to 
my judgment would be superior in every sense – there is still a sense, on my view, in which the 
akratic action displays a kind of rationality, namely, it is a free response that is sensitive to 
normatively relevant features of the situation that matter to me. On my view, then, akrasia is 
always ecologically or existentially rational—it’s always a matter of taking an action that matters 
to me given who I am.  
 
So I disagree with Davidson and Mele vis-à-vis the paradox of irrationality, and I disagree for 
two principal reasons. First, our deliberative skill is fallible. Its agility and depth varies across 
individuals and within individuals across occasions; and it all too often involves misinformation, 
myopia, motivated reasoning, bias, and bandwidth limitations. Indeed, clear-sighted, 
undistorted deliberation that brings all the relevant normative features of a situation into view is 
rare, and, as empirical psychology has shown time and again, it’s not great at predicting what 
will make us happy.100 Hence, it’s not uncommon for people to mistrust their own judgment, not 
unheard of for some to lose faith in it entirely, and not unusual for people to treat deliberation as 
a collaborative affair, involving significant others and relevant peers to bolster what we know to 
be a fallible skill. So the fact that our better judgment is fallible is the first reason it’s not 
inexplicable that we sometimes act against our better judgment.101  
 
The second reason is that our other EAs, like our deliberative skill, are rooted in our agency and 
sensitive to normative considerations. That’s why all the examples of akratic action that we’ve 
considered in this paper ultimately seem explicable. They might not be objectively more 
rational than the relevant alternative, but they all make sense: Gina is responsive to the needs of 
Ella, Betty is sensitive to the claims of an intellectual life, Black responds to the situational 
features that count in favour of cutting lose, I resent Wayne’s rude behavior, and Emily is 
attuned to some of the ways her current life makes her miserable. Akratic actions make sense for 
the same reasons they are properly intentional: they are guided by one’s EA; they are 
accompanied by non-observational practical knowledge of what one’s up to and to what end; 
and they are sensitive to normatively relevant features of the situation. So although you might 
act against what you take the balance of reasons to be, your akratic action does not seem 
essentially surd. You might feel torn by the pull of your better judgment, but on a pre-reflective 
level, you know what you’re up to and why.  
 
8. Conclusion and Future Work 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 For a helpful review of this research in a philosophical context, see Tiberius, V. (2008). The 
Reflective Life: Living Wisely with Our Limits. Oxford University Press on Demand. 
101 My thinking here is influenced by Borgoni, C., & Luthra, Y. (2017). Epistemic akrasia and the 
fallibility of critical reasoning. Philosophical Studies, 174(4), 877-886. 
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In this article, I have tried to make sense of akrasia by drawing on resources from 
phenomenology, the cognitive sciences, analytic action theory, and recent “hybrid models” of 
skilled action. I have argued that we can solve the apparent paradox of akrasia – i.e., the notion 
that it is both impossible and ubiquitous – by understanding akrasia as SPIA that is guided by 
our EAs, accompanied by non-observational practical knowledge of our intention, and sensitive 
to normatively relevant features of the situation. In developing this account, I have defended it 
against objections that it shares the shortcomings of externalism; and I have attempted to show 
how this account can contribute to the conversation about the “paradox of irrationality” and 
“rational akrasia.”  
 
I want to end by bookmarking some unfinished business. As it stands, the view I’ve defended 
here is vulnerable to another important objection. In the foregoing, I’ve addressed a form action 
against one’s better judgment that is superficially irrational but existentially rational: the 
characters in my examples act against their better judgment but in accord with some aspect of 
who they are. However, sometimes people take actions against their better judgment that are 
deeply irrational, i.e., radically inconsistent with their deepest sense of who they are. These are 
actions where an agent doesn’t seem to have any agential commitment to an EA relevant to the 
action she takes, or actions when she has made every effort to extirpate some EA from her life 
and yet continues to act on it anyway. These are profoundly irrational actions that seem to 
involve a breakdown of agency, because it stretches our credulity to think than an agent could 
intentionally take an action so radically at odds with any plausible account of what she thinks is 
best and who she is (or wants to be). There are resources within my view to account for this 
species of action too. To do so, I will have to distinguish between akrasia and weakness of will: 
where akrasia denotes intentionally acting against your all-things-considered better judgment, 
and weakness of will refers to acting against your decisive better judgment due to agential 
breakdown. Since I didn’t have the space to go into it here, I have dealt with it in another 
forthcoming paper.102  
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